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Abstract
The voluminous and protracted litigation and arbitration saga featuring the Republic of Ar-
gentina (mostly as defendant or respondent, respectively) established important legal and arbitral
precedents, as illustrated by three cases involving Argentina which were appealed all the way up to
the US Supreme Court and were settled in 2014. At first glance, the scale of Argentina-related lit-
igation activity might be explained by the sheer size of the government’s 2001 default, the world’s
largest-ever up to that point. However, its true origins are to be found in the unusually coercive
and aggressive way that the authorities in that country went about defaulting on, and restructuring,
their sovereign debt obligations. The mass filing of arbitration claims, in turn, was prompted by
Argentina’s radical and seemingly irreversible changes to the “rules of the game” affecting foreign
strategic investors, which broke with binding commitments prior governments had made in multi-
ple bilateral investment treaties. In sum, a major deviation from best practices as understood and
settled in the early 2000s, which codified how economic policy adjustments are to be made in a
way that minimizes damage to the investment climate, preserves access to the international capi-
tal markets, and promotes rapid and sustainable economic growth, lies at the root of Argentina’s
litigation and arbitration saga which came to an end during 2016.
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INTRODUCTION 
During the 2002-2016 period, hundreds of thousands of foreign 
investors in Argentina—they had purchased equity stakes in local 
companies, founded affiliates or subsidiaries there, or else had bought 
government bonds during the 1990s—became plaintiffs in judicial or 
arbitration proceedings brought against the Republic of Argentina.1 
For the most part, these cases were heard in the federal courts of the 
United States, or else in arbitral proceedings hosted by the 
International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes 
(“ICSID”).2 Given the sheer number of cases filed and appealed, the 
substantial sums at stake, and the complexities involved because the 
defendant was a sovereign state (combined with unwillingness on 
Argentina’s part to settle out of court, or to honor judgments and 
awards rendered against it), the litigations and arbitrations became 
veritable sagas.3 These sagas finally came to an end during 2016, in 
the wake of a new government elected in Argentina on a platform that 
included achieving a reconciliation with foreign investors in order to 
regain access to international debt and equity markets. 4  The new 
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1. Thousands of Argentine investors also litigated against their government in local 
courts, and dozens sought redress abroad, availing themselves of legal recourse for 
bondholders who had purchased Argentine government bonds issued in other jurisdictions and 
subject to foreign law – overwhelmingly, the United States and New York law. 
2 . As detailed below, there were also proceedings against Argentina under the 
International Chamber of Commerce (“ICC”) International Court of Arbitration and under ad 
hoc tribunals established in accordance with the rules of the United Nations Commission on 
International Trade Law (“UNCITRAL”). 
3. Until early 2016, the principal monetary winners of this litigation marathon had surely 
been the armies of lawyers and experts marshaled—and duly paid—by all sides in order to 
pursue or defend against lawsuits and arbitration claims filed in multiple jurisdictions. This 
author served as a remunerated expert witness in one judicial case and in one arbitration claim. 
See Seijas v. Republic of Argentina, No. 10 Civ. 4300 (TPG), 2011 WL 1137942, at *8-9 
(S.D.N.Y. Mar. 28, 2011); Abaclat v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/5. 
4. In a second round of presidential elections in Argentina held on November 22, 2015, 
Mauricio Macri, of the centrist coalition Cambiemos, narrowly defeated Daniel Scioli, of the 
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authorities settled with virtually all claimants in principle and then, in 
April, placed US$16.5 billion of new bonds in the United States and 
elsewhere—the largest emerging-market debt sale then on record—to 
raise the funds needed to pay for the settlements.5 
I. IMPORTANCE OF THE ARGENTINA SAGA 
The legacy of the voluminous and protracted Argentina-related 
litigation and arbitration saga is that precedents were established and 
legal history was made. In terms of the litigation, the outcome of three 
cases involving Argentina, which were appealed all the way to the US 
Supreme Court and decided in 2014—all three against Argentina, 
disregarding in each instance amicus support for Argentina’s position 
from the US government—serve to illustrate the point. 
On March 5, 2014, the Court ruled on a case (BG Grp. PLC v. 
Republic of Argentina) in which, for the first time in its history, the 
dispute involved a bilateral investment treaty (“BIT”): in this 
instance, the BIT binding the United Kingdom and Argentina as it 
applied to a claim that had been won by the BG Group, a British 
multinational oil and gas company.6 Overturning an appellate ruling 
that the investor’s failure to fulfill a particular treaty requirement 
(Article 8) had deprived arbitrators of jurisdiction, as alleged by 
Argentina, and in spite of an amicus proffered by the United States 
favorable to Argentina,7 the Court’s seven-member majority ruled for 
the claimant and effectively reinstated a US$185 million arbitral 
award payable by Argentina to the BG Group.89 
																																																																																																																																								
incumbent Frente para la Victoria, a Peronist populist party that had ruled Argentina for 
twelve years, as led by President Néstor Kirchner (in office from May 25, 2003 until 
December 10, 2007), then by his wife Cristina Fernández Kirchner (in office through 
December 9, 2015). 
5. Benedict Mander & Elaine Moore, Argentina Puts an End To Long Holdouts Saga, 
FIN. TIMES (Apr. 22, 2016), https://next.ft.com/content/516ab98a-08a1-11e6-876d-b823056  
b209b; see also Alexandra Stevenson, How Argentina Settled a Billion-Dollar Debt Dispute 
With Hedge Funds, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 25, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/ 2016/04/25
/business/dealbook/how-argentina-settled-a-billion-dollar-debt-dispute-with-hedge-
funds.html?_r=0. 
6. See BG Grp. PLC v. Republic of Argentina, 134 S. Ct. 1198 (2014). 
7. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae in Support of Vacatur and Remand, BG 
Grp. PLC v. Republic of Argentina, 134 S. Ct. 1198 (2014). 
8. Article 8 specified that investors wishing to arbitrate a dispute with the host country 
first had to submit the dispute to the country’s local court system and then wait for eighteen 
months. However, the arbitration panel concluded that it had jurisdiction because, among other 
things, Argentina’s conduct (which included enacting new laws that hindered recourse to its 
judiciary by firms in BG Group’s situation) had excused the claimant from its failure to 
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Two other important cases were decided in mid-June 2014. In 
the first, Republic of Argentina v. NML Capital Ltd., the Supreme 
Court had been asked to consider how widely and far—including 
around the globe—investors may go in search of a sovereign’s assets 
when it refuses to pay on its outstanding judgments. 10  Here the 
petitioner was Argentina and the respondent was NML Capital, Ltd., 
one of its defaulted bondholders, who had prevailed in eleven debt-
collection actions that it brought against the sovereign, and yet had 
not managed to collect anything.11 In aid of executing the judgments, 
NML sought discovery of Argentina’s property, serving subpoenas on 
two non-party banks for records relating to the sovereign’s global 
financial transactions. The Southern District of New York granted 
NML’s motions to compel compliance, and the Second Circuit 
affirmed.12 
Argentina appealed, claiming that the Foreign Sovereign 
Immunities Act of 1976 (“FSIA”) does not empower courts to order 
the discovery demanded by the subpoenas, and that such discovery of 
foreign-state property would infringe on sovereign immunity and the 
principles behind it.13 Asked for its opinion, the Justice Department 
filed a brief siding with Argentina, expressing concern that permitting 
such sweeping examination of a foreign state’s assets by US courts 
would risk reciprocal adverse treatment of the United States in foreign 
courts.14 In any event, the Supreme Court ruled by another seven-
member majority that no provision in the FSIA immunizes a foreign-
																																																																																																																																								
comply with Article 8’s requirement. See Diane Marie Amann, Opinion Analysis: Clear 
Statement Ruling in Investor-State Arbitration Case Leaves Open Question on U.S. Bilateral 
Treaties, SCOTUSBLOG (Mar. 6, 2014, 4:06 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2014/03/ 
opinion-analysis-clear-statement-ruling-in-investor-state-arbitration-case-leaves-open-
question-on-u-s-bilateral-treaties/. 
9. For a critique of the court’s reasoning, though not of the outcome, see Jarrod Wong, 
BG Group v. Republic of Argentina: A Supreme Misunderstanding of Investment Treaty 
Arbitration, 43 PEPP. L. REV. 541 (2016). 
10. See Republic of Argentina v. NML Capital, Ltd., 134 S. Ct. 2250 (2014). 
11 . NML Capital is a Cayman Islands-based offshore unit of Paul Singer’s Elliott 
Management Corporation. See Georgina Hurst, New Argentina Debt Crisis Spells Trouble for 
Custodian Banks, INST. INV. (Sept. 23, 2014), http:// www. institutionalinvestor.com/article/ 
3383263/banking-and-capital-markets-emerging-markets/new-argentina-debt-crisis-spells-
trouble-for-custodian-banks.html#.VJb4Af97A. 
12. See Lyle Denniston, Argument Preview: A Global Search for Money, SCOTUSBLOG 
(Apr. 16, 2014, 7:48 AM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2014/04/argument-preview-a-global-
search-for-money/. 
13. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, NML Capital, Ltd., 134 S. Ct. 2250 (No. 12-842).  
14. Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioner, NML Capital, Ltd., 
134 S. Ct. 2250 (No. 12-842). 
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sovereign judgment debtor from post-judgment discovery of 
information concerning its extraterritorial assets. It thereby gave a 
precedent-setting green light for judgment debtors to scour the world 
in search of potentially attachable sovereign assets.15 
In the second case decided in mid-June 2014, NML Capital, Ltd. 
v. Republic of Argentina, Argentina asked the Supreme Court to take 
up a case in which the same NML Capital was the lead plaintiff. NML 
and other unpaid investors had proven, at least to the satisfaction of 
the District Court and the Second Circuit, that their bond covenants 
(from the 1990s) included Argentina’s unconditional waiver of 
sovereign immunity and a particularly creditor-friendly version of the 
boilerplate pari passu clause, according to which Argentina had 
promised the same treatment and payment priority as it would afford 
its other bondholders. Because Argentina had been paying creditors 
who had agreed to its punishing restructuring terms, but had not paid 
anything to its holdout creditors, NML had requested, and the lower 
courts had agreed, to remedy the breach of contract with an order of 
specific performance. The District Court had entered and, despite 
contrary advice from the US government, 16  the Court of Appeals 
concurred with an injunction providing that whenever the Republic 
pays any amount due under the terms of its bonds, it must also pay 
plaintiffs the same fraction of the amount due to them.17 In so doing, 
the courts cleared the way for investors to demand payment on the 
bonds they held whenever Argentina made any payments to holders 
of later bond issues which were being honored—a novel form of 
injunctive relief.18 
Argentina then filed a writ of certiorari requesting review on the 
grounds that the pari passu clause should be interpreted by the New 
York Court of Appeals, since it involved contract language under 
New York state law, and that the remedy fashioned by the lower 
courts coerced a sovereign to pay with assets that the FSIA allegedly 
																																																													
15. On the importance of this case, see Adriana T. Ingenito & Christina G. Hioureas, 
Carving Out New Exceptions to Sovereign Immunity: Why the NML Capital Cases May Harm 
U.S. Interests Abroad, 30 MD. J. INT’L L. 118 (2015); Aaron D. Simowitz, Transnational 
Enforcement Discovery, 83 FORDHAM L. REV. 3293 (2015).  
16 . Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae in Support of the Republic of 
Argentina’s Petition for Panel Rehearing and Rehearing En Banc, NML Capital, Ltd. v. 
Republic of Argentina, No. 12-105(L) (2d Cir. Dec. 28, 2012).  
17. NML Capital, Ltd. v. Republic of Argentina, 727 F.3d 230 (2d Cir. 2013). 
18. See Lyle Denniston, No Relief for Argentina on Debt, SCOTUSBLOG (June 16, 2014, 
12:57 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2014/06/no-relief-for-argentina-on-debt/.  
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held immune.19 However, the Supreme Court denied review without 
comment,20 a decision of legal importance and immediate financial-
market impact: it prompted Argentina to default anew on its universe 
of post-restructuring, foreign-law bonds rather than pay the successful 
plaintiffs what the courts had deemed they were owed.21 While this 
novel enforcement mechanism (for a private creditor attempting to 
collect from a rogue sovereign debtor) did not yield the desired result, 
the pari passu case also set an important precedent.22 
The Argentina-related arbitration saga, involving more than fifty 
cases lodged just with ICSID, likewise established important 
precedents.23  In virtually every case that Argentina had to justify 
measures taken to the detriment of foreign investors, the nation 
pointed to BIT provisions allowing for exceptions to agreed conduct 
in times of major economic, political or social crisis. Specific clauses, 
such as Article XI of the United States-Argentina BIT, allowing the 
exclusion from the coverage of the treaty of measures “necessary for 
the maintenance of public order, the . . . maintenance or restoration of 
																																																													
19. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Republic of Argentina v. NML Capital, Ltd. (Feb. 18, 
2014), available at http://sblog.s3.amazonaws.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/03/2014-02-18-
Argentina-Petition-for-Certiorari-Final-as-filed1.pdf. 
20. Order List, 573 U.S. 5 (June 16, 2014), available at http:// www. supremecourt.gov
/orders/courtorders/061614zor_2b8e.pdf. 
21. Fitch Downgrades Argentina’s FC IDR to ‘RD’, FITCH RATINGS (July 31, 2014, 
3:48 PM), https://www.fitchratings.com/creditdesk/press_releases/detail.cfm?pr_id=843318; 
Gabriel Torres & Bart Oosterveld, Moody’s Changes Argentina’s Outlook to Negative as 
Default Will Hasten Economic Decline, MOODY’S (July 31, 2014), https://www.  
moodys.com/research/Moodys-changes-Argentinas-outlook-to-negative-as-default-will-
hasten—PR_305436; Argentina Foreign Currency Ratings Lowered To ‘SD’ After Holders of 
Discount Bonds Did Not Receive Interest Payment, STANDARD & POOR’S (July 30, 2014), 
http://www.buenosairesherald.com/files/vinculos/201407/165882_30_183236.pdf.  
22.  For some early analysis, see Emma Kingdon, Leveraging Litigation: Enforcing 
Sovereign Debt Obligations in NML Capital, Ltd. v. Republic of Argentina, 37 B.C. INT’L & 
COMP. L. REV. 30 (2014); Brett Neve, NML Capital, Ltd. v. Republic of Argentina: An 
Alternative to the Inadequate Remedies under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, 39 N.C. 
J. INT’L L. & COM. REG. 631 (2014). For the view from the winning attorneys in both NML 
cases, see Matthew D. McGill & Alexander N. Harris, NML Capital v. Argentina: Enforcing 
Contracts in the Shadow of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, 30 MD. J. INT’L L. 3 
(2015). 
23. According to ICSID, there were thirty-five cases concluded as of October 2016 (up 
from twenty-nine as of the end of 2014), in which Argentina was the respondent (defendant). 
See Cases, INT’L CTR. SETTLEMENT INV. DISP., https://icsid.worldbank.org/  
apps/ICSIDWEB/cases/Pages/AdvancedSearch.aspx?cs=CD28&rntly=ST4 (last visited Oct. 
31, 2016). In addition, there were eighteen cases still pending resolution as of October 2016 
(down from twenty-two cases as of end of 2014). See Cases, INT’L CTR. SETTLEMENT INV. 
DISP., https://icsid.worldbank.org/apps/ICSIDWEB/cases/Pages/AdvancedSearch.aspx?cs=CD
27&rntly=ST4 (last visited Oct. 31, 2016).  
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international peace or security, or the protection of its own essential 
security interests” had been routinely invoked by Argentina as valid 
grounds for policy decisions which had deleterious consequences for 
international investors.24 
The different conclusions reached in numerous arbitral decisions 
involving Argentina suggest that while the case law was not settled, it 
was definitely enriched. 25  For example, in several instances the 
tribunals found that Argentina’s policies had contributed significantly 
to the economic crisis and the emergency invoked, and also that the 
measures adopted by the government at the time were not the only 
way for it to have safeguarded its interests. Therefore, Argentina 
could not be exempted from its responsibilities to investors. In other 
arbitrations, it was deemed that Argentina could rely on the defense of 
necessity only for a limited period—when there really was a threat to 
public order and to the government’s essential security interests—but 
not after 2003, when the economic crisis subsided.26 One of the more 
recent decisions in the stream of investment arbitrations involving 
Argentina, El Paso Energy v. Argentina (concluded in 2011, affirmed 
after an annulment application was dismissed in September 2014), 
held that Argentina had contributed to the state of necessity, and thus 
it could not avail itself of the necessity defense.27 
Argentina’s mistreatment of foreign investors also elicited the 
first ICSID arbitral proceedings involving groups of bondholders, 
marking a major expansion in the role of these arbitrations in 
determining to what extent States have failed to protect purely 
financial investors who made loans or purchased bonds (or even 
financial derivatives), in contravention of whatever commitments had 
been made in bilateral investment treaties. The ICSID Convention and 
Rules do not specifically address the use of mass claims processes, 
and jurisdiction is limited to legal disputes arising directly out of an 
																																																													
24. Treaty Concerning the Reciprocal Encouragement and Protection of Investment, 
U.S.-Arg., art. XI, Nov. 14, 1991, S. TREATY DOC. NO. 103-2 (1993). 
25. Giorgio Sacerdoti, BIT Protections and Economic Crises: Limits to Their Coverage, 
the Impact of Multilateral Financial Regulation and the Defense of Necessity, 28 ICSID REV. 
351 (2013).  
26. See Michael Waibel, Two Worlds of Necessity in ICSID Arbitration: CMS and 
LG&E, 20 LEIDEN J. INT’L L. 637 (2007) (discussing an early example of two diametrically 
opposed rulings). 
27. Sacerdoti, supra note 25, at 381; see also El Paso Energy Int’l Co. v. the Argentine 
Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/15 (Sep. 22, 2014). 
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“investment,” but the notion of investment was never defined.28 As a 
result, in all proceedings Argentina always questioned the proper 
standing of bondholder groups and the relevance of their 
“investments.” 
In February 2007, a group of more than 190,000 Italian 
bondholders registered a request for ICSID arbitration against the 
Argentine Republic, relying not on a violation of Argentina’s 
obligations under its bond contracts—a claim that had been pursued 
without success in the Italian courts29—but on its obligations under 
the Italy-Argentina BIT (Abaclat & Others v. The Argentine 
Republic). 30  In its pioneering decision on jurisdiction and 
admissibility issued in August 2011,31 the ICSID tribunal reached the 
important, if controversial, conclusion that it had the authority to 
conduct a collective-claims proceeding, and that the bondholders had 
made a duly protected “investment.”32 The outcome of the claim was 
																																																													
28 . Christoph Schreuer, Investment Arbitration, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF 
INTERNATIONAL ADJUDICATION 296 (Cesare P. R. Romano, Karen J. Alter & Yuval Shany 
eds., 2014). 
29. See Jürgen Bröhmer, Immunity and Sovereign Bonds, in IMMUNITIES IN THE AGE OF 
GLOBAL CONSTITUTIONALISM 190 (Anne Peters, Evelyne Lagrange, Stefan Oeter & Christian 
Tomuschat eds., 2014) (discussing that a precedent highly damaging to Italian creditors had 
been set by the 2005 Borri v. Argentina judgment by the Italian Court of Cassation, which 
accorded Argentina immunity because the issuance of bonds was an act performed jure 
imperii, and the rights of the Argentine people had to be balanced against the losses of Italian 
creditors). 
30 .  See Press Release, L'Associazione Per La Tutela Degli Investitori In Titoli 
Argentini, ICSID Registers Request for Arbitration Brought By 195,000 Italian Investors 
Against Argentina (Feb. 9, 2007), http://www.tfargentina.it/  download/ TFA%20Press%
20Release%209%20Feb%202007.pdf (discussing claimants’ representation in these 
proceedings by Associazione per la Tutela degli Investitori in Titoli Argentini, otherwise 
known as Task Force Argentina (“TFA”), a group underwritten by eight Italian banks that had 
been most active in selling Argentine bonds to their retail clients); see also L’Associazione, 
ASSOCIAZIONE PER LA TUTELA DEGLI INVESTITORI IN TITOLI ARGENTINI, 
www.tfargentina.it/chisiamo.php (last visited on Oct. 31, 2016). TFA had previously filed 
lawsuits in US federal courts on behalf of Italian investors holding bonds governed by New 
York law, as well as in various European jurisdictions, alleging Argentina’s breach of its 
contracts; the number of individual Italian claimants in Abaclat & Others would later be 
reduced to under 60,000. 
31. Abaclat & Others v. The Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/5 (Aug. 4, 
2011). 
32. Donald Francis Donovan, Abaclat & Others v. Argentine Republic: As a Collective 
Claims Proceeding, 27 ICSID REV. 261 (2012); Céline Lévesque, Abaclat & Others v. 
Argentine Republic: The Definition of Investment, 27 ICSID REV. 247 (2012); Ryan McCarl, 
ICSID Jurisdiction Over International Mass Investment Arbitrations: Due Process and Default 
Rules, 51 STAN. J. INT’L L. 173 (2015); Andrea Marco Steingruber, Abaclat & Others v. 
Argentine Republic: Consent in Large-scale Arbitration Proceedings, 27 ICSID REV. 237 
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expected to be announced in early 2016, with a potential award to 
bondholders that could easily run into the billions of dollars, but the 
proceedings were suspended after the new government in Argentina 
settled with these and other holdout bondholders. 
Two other (much smaller) groups of Italian bondholders had also 
decided to pursue arbitration against Argentina under ICSID: 
Giovanni Alemanni and Others v. Argentine Republic, registered in 
March 2007, and Ambiente Ufficio S.p.A. and Others v. Argentine 
Republic, registered in July 2008. Decisions on jurisdiction and 
admissibility favorable to the claimants were issued in November 
2014 and February 2013, respectively, but both arbitrations were 
discontinued during the course of 2015 due to lack of payment of the 
required advances. 33  In sum, although the aforementioned three 
arbitration cases never reached finality and thus did not see awards 
being rendered, they represented a turning point in the investment 
arbitration regime, having carved a path that could lead to a change in 
the dynamics of sovereign debt restructurings via the investment 
arbitration option.34 
Argentina’s international arbitration saga will also be 
remembered because the country broke with tradition and for many 
years refused to pay the awards against it, exposing for all to see a 
vulnerability inherent in the “gentlemen’s agreement” nature of 
arbitration enforcement against sovereigns. In the threefold arbitral 
strategy followed by Argentina during 2002-2015, the country 
pressured claimants into entering into “amicable settlements” (e.g., by 
conditioning regulatory relief at home on achieving a settlement of 
claims abroad); then, in the case of unfavorable awards, it always 
filed for the annulment of the awards on whatever basis could 
possibly be claimed; and finally, whenever such annulment motions 
were unsuccessful, through continued stays of enforcement of the 
awards based on the novel interpretation (of Art. 54 of the ICSID 
																																																																																																																																								
(2012); Samuel Wordsworth, Abaclat & Others v. Argentine Republic: Jurisdiction, 
Admissibility and Pre-conditions to Arbitration, 27 ICSID REV. 255 (2012). 
33. Giovanni Alemanni & Others v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/8 
(Dec. 14, 2015); Ambiente Ufficio S.p.A. & Others v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. 
ARB/08/9 (May 28, 2015). 
34.  Belen Olmos Giupponi, ICSID Tribunals and Sovereign Debt Restructuring-Related 
Litigation: Mapping the Further Implications of the Alemanni Decision, 30 ICSID REV. 556 
(2015); Joanna Simões, Sovereign Bond Disputes before ICSID Tribunals: Lessons from the 
Argentina Crisis, 17 LAW & BUS. REV. AM. 683 (2011). 
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Convention) that international arbitral awards were subject to 
approval by the courts of Argentina.35 
II. ORIGINS OF BONDHOLDER LITIGATON 
Litigation against sovereign states is a fairly modern vehicle for 
the redress of material claims. During most of recorded history, 
private lenders and investors did not have the necessary legal rights to 
demand, and thus the legal mechanisms to compel, payment from 
foreign States. Governments and private parties accepted that 
sovereigns could not be held accountable outside their domestic 
courts, under what came to be known as the doctrine of “absolute” 
sovereign immunity. Faced with an event of default, and lacking any 
legal remedies, private creditors would: accept non-payment or else 
new payment terms decided unilaterally by foreign States; band 
together to limit a sovereign debtor’s access to new capital, thereby 
gaining some leverage to discuss a settlement; or they would pressure 
their own governments to take up their cause and negotiate on their 
behalf, retaliate against the deadbeat sovereign by imposing (usually 
trade) sanctions, or in the extreme, intervene militarily for the purpose 
of collecting on unpaid debts—“gunboat diplomacy.” 36 
After the end of World War II, governments increasingly sought 
ways to minimize their being dragged into disputes involving cross-
border business transactions, and also ways to start holding 
accountable the growing number of state-owned enterprises, including 
Soviet firms, whose legal immunity gave them an unfair advantage 
over private companies. 37  In 1952, the US Department of State 
																																																													
35 . Inna Uchkunova & Oleg Temnikov, Enforcement of Awards under the ICSID 
Convention: What Solutions to the Problem of State Immunity?, 29 ICSID REV. 187 (2014); 
Eric David Kasenetz, Desperate Times Call for Desperate Measures: The Aftermath of 
Argentina’s State of Necessity and the Current Fight in the ICSID, 41 GEO. WASH. INT’L L. 
REV. 709 (2010). 
36 .  FEDERICO STURZENEGGER & JEROMIN ZETTELMEYER, DEBT DEFAULTS AND 
LESSONS FROM A DECADE OF CRISES 11 (2007). The most institutionalized, powerful, and 
celebrated such creditor association was the British Corporation of Foreign Bondholders 
(“CFB”), established in London in 1868. By approving or withholding access to the London 
financial market, it was able to negotiate with the governments of Argentina, Brazil, Greece, 
Mexico, Peru, Spain, Portugal, and Turkey, among others. CFB-type organizations were 
eventually set up in France and Belgium (1898), Switzerland (1912), Germany (1927), and the 
United States (1933). The CFB and its counterpart organizations in other countries remained 
active until the 1950s, when most of the sovereign defaults of the 1930s were settled. Id. 
37. Mark B. Feldman, The United States Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976 in 
Perspective: A Founder’s View, 35 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 302 (1986). 
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adopted what is nowadays referred to as the “restrictive” theory of 
foreign sovereign immunity, under which foreign States are entitled to 
immunity from suit for their sovereign (public) acts but not for their 
commercial activities—the classic distinction between acts jure 
imperii and acts jure gestionis. The State Department retained for 
itself initial responsibility to decide questions of sovereign immunity 
using the new immunity framework, but the policy’s application left a 
great deal to be desired because State did not always issue an opinion 
on misbehaving sovereigns, or else it was biased by foreign-policy 
considerations.38 Moreover, the property of foreign States continued 
to be absolutely immune from execution to satisfy any judgments 
obtained through the US courts. 
The restrictive theory of sovereign immunity was codified into 
US law through the aforementioned FSIA of 1976, and shortly 
thereafter, the United Kingdom passed a similar law, the State 
Immunity Act of 1978. Many other countries have since followed in 
their footstep or else their courts have expressly accepted the concept 
of restrictive (or relative) sovereign immunity – one that the Council 
of Europe had already adopted via the European Convention on State 
Immunity of 1972, which became effective in 1976.39 
The FSIA was passed to provide a statutory framework for 
resolving issues of sovereign immunity through the judicial branch 
without reliance on the State Department. The law established the 
general rule that foreign government property is immune, but setting 
out exceptions (28 U.S.C. §§ 1330, 1602-11) under which US courts 
may exercise jurisdiction over a foreign State (e.g., when it has 
waived its immunity or engaged in commercial activities) and may 
subject foreign state assets to attachment, arrest, or execution. Passage 
of the FSIA and its equivalents elsewhere gave rise to the first cases 
of litigation against sovereign debtors in the 1980s, including 
commercial banks seeking to collect on their defaulted loans to 
governments or their entities. 
A recent, comprehensive study of litigation against sovereigns 
during the period 1976-2010, focused on foreign commercial banks or 
institutional investors with claims related to loan or bond contracts, 
identified 120 instances of legal actions against a total of twenty-five 
																																																													
38. Id. at 303-04. 
39 . ALICE DE JONGE, TRANSNATIONAL CORPORATIONS AND INTERNATIONAL LAW: 
ACCOUNTABILITY IN THE GLOBAL BUSINESS ENVIRONMENT 112 (2011). 
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defaulting sovereigns. 40  Interestingly, 102 of them (eighty five 
percent) comprised cases filed in the United States, mostly in the 
Southern District of New York, suggestive of the dominance of New 
York law as a venue for contract-writing and the US courts for 
contract-dispute resolution. Only thirty out of 180 sovereign defaults 
in sixty-eight countries, or less than one-fifth of total, engendered any 
litigation at all—half of them a single lawsuit—suggesting that most 
defaults and ensuing debt restructurings were accepted by the parties 
involved. 
Most relevant to this article, Argentina alone accounted for one-
third of the case universe, with forty-one commercial-creditor 
lawsuits filed—all of them following just one of its four defaults 
during the 1976-2010 period: the one that took place in December of 
2001. According to the study, no other country or default has ever 
attracted anywhere near as much litigation. Argentina’s prominence 
in this arena is particularly evident given the number of lawsuits and 
class actions filed also by retail investors, as discussed below, which 
the study excluded from consideration. 
At first glance, the scale of Argentina-related litigation might be 
explained by the sheer size of the government’s 2001 default. At the 
time, it was the largest in history, involving potentially US$145 
billion in public indebtedness, although it soon became clear that the 
default would apply to less than US$95 billion in obligations largely 
to non-resident bondholders and to a lesser extent to official creditors 
such as trade-finance banks (e.g., the US Export-Import Bank) and 
foreign-aid agencies.41 However, in early 2012, Greece’s own default 
set a new world record with a restructuring involving approximately 
US$265 billion (more precisely, EUR€196 billion) of obligations to 
domestic and foreign bondholders. 42  The gigantic Greek default 
attracted not a single lawsuit, nonetheless, even though in the days 
																																																													
40. Julian Schumacher, Christoph Trebesch, & Henrik Enderlein, Sovereign Defaults in 
Court (May 6, 2014), https://sites.google.com/site/christophtrebesch/research/Sovereign
DefaultsinCourt.pdf?attredirects=0. Lawsuits filed by retail investors were excluded, as were 
multiple suits (in different jurisdictions) by the same creditor, and disputes over procurement 
bills or unpaid checks. 
41. Most resident bondholders had already been subject to a restructuring in November 
2001. The official bilateral creditors mentioned were owed less than US$5 billion as of the end 
of 2001. See Deuda del Sector Publico Nacional por Instrumento y por Tipo de Plazo, 
Ministerio de Economía/Secretaría de Finanzas (Dec. 31, 2001), http://www.mecon.gov.  
ar/onp/html/boletin/4totrim01/pdf/fisc25.pdf. 
42 . Jeromin Zettelmeyer, Christoph Trebesch, & Mitu Gulati, The Greek Debt 
Restructuring: An Autopsy, 28 ECON. POL’Y 513 (2013). 
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before the restructuring a “wave of potential litigation” reportedly 
was a threat. 43  This was the case despite the fact that the Greek 
restructuring imposed even heavier losses on bondholders than did the 
Argentine restructuring, something which could have prompted the 
proverbial runs to the courthouse.44 A single arbitral claim against 
Greece was lodged with ICSID by a Slovak bank in 2013 in 
connection with the 2012 debt restructuring, but it was dismissed in 
April 2015. 45  There are other factors that provide the most valid 
explanation for the origins of the Argentina litigation, and they relate 
to the unilateral, coercive and aggressive way the authorities in that 
country went about managing, defaulting and restructuring their debt 
obligations. 
III. DEPARTURES FROM BEST PRACTICE 
As detailed below, Argentina’s behavior did not conform to best 
practices as settled already in the early 2000s, by which time plenty of 
experience had been accumulated from a multitude of sovereigns 
having encountered debt-servicing difficulties in the 1980s and 1990s. 
Indeed, it was partly out of concern that Argentina’s errant behavior 
would set an undesirable precedent that the “Principles for Stable 
Capital Flows and Fair Debt Restructuring” were conceived. They 
constitute a voluntary code of conduct between sovereign debt issuers 
and their private-sector creditors that was agreed in the early 2000s, 
encouraged by the G20 Ministerial Meeting of 2002, and welcomed 
																																																													
43. Sarah White & Tommy Wilkes, Hedge Funds Prepare Legal Battle with Greece, 
REUTERS (Jan.  24, 2012, 6:52 AM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/01/24/greece-hedge-
funds-idUSL5E8CN0OR20120124. 
44. According to rating agency Moody’s, Argentina’s restructuring in 2005 imposed 
losses of seventy-one percent and Greece’s in 2012 entailed losses of seventy-six percent, as 
measured by average issuer-weighted prices of sovereign bonds the day before the close of 
their respective distressed-debt exchanges. Elena Duggar, Investor Losses in Modern-Era 
Sovereign Bond Restructurings, MOODY’S INV. SERV. (Aug. 7, 2012), https://ftalphaville-
cdn.ft.com/wp-content/uploads/2012/09/Sovereign-Default-Series-Investor-Losses-in-Modern-
Era-Sovereign-Bond-Restructurings.pdf. 
45. Poštová banka a.s., a Slovak bank that alleged to have purchased Greek sovereign 
bonds in 2010 and its Cypriot shareholder, Istrokapital SE, filed an arbitral claim with ICSID 
in May 2013 under the Greece-Slovak Republic and the Cyprus-Greece bilateral investment 
treaties, challenging measures taken by the Hellenic Republic in 2012 to address its financial 
crisis. A decision against the claimants was rendered by the ICSID tribunal on April 9, 2015 
on the basis that the definition of “investment” in the BIT at issue in this case does not extend 
to Poštová banka’s ownership of Greek government bonds. Francesco Montanaro, Poštová 
Banka SA and Istrokapital SE v Hellenic Republic Sovereign Bonds and the Puzzling 
Definition of ‘Investment’ in International Investment Law, 30 ICSID REV. 549 (2015). 
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by the same body in Berlin two years later.46 Best practices in the 
early 2000s are also distilled in an informative book published in 
2003, which explained how sovereign debt-restructurings had been 
handled during the 1980s and 1990s by the official and private 
sectors. 47  It is on the basis of these two sources, plus personal 
experience,48 that the following table has been prepared. 
 
TABLE 1: ARGENTINA’S BEHAVIOR RELATIVE TO BEST 
PRACTICE IN SOVEREIGN DEBT MANAGEMENT 
 
Best Practice Argentina 
Engage in regular dialogue with creditors on key 
economic and financial policies  
Not practiced 
Consult with creditors on how to forestall debt-service 
problems before defaulting 
Not practiced 
If a debt restructuring becomes inevitable, enter into 
timely, good-faith negotiations 
Not practiced 
Stop incurring debt when already burdened by too 
much debt 
Not practiced 
Seek debt relief appropriate to the nature of the 
liquidity or solvency problem 
Not practiced 
Recognize interest arrears and treat them preferentially 
versus past-due principal 
Not practiced 
Seek the financial support and endorsement of 
multilateral agencies 
Not practiced 
																																																													
46 . Principles for Stable Capital Flows and Fair Debt Restructuring: Report on 
Implementation by The Principles Consultative Group, INST. INT’L FIN. 33 (Oct. 2014), 
https://www.iif.com/file/6573/download?token=sVzJwuyF. The seed of the Principles was 
planted in 2001 when Banque de France Gov. Jean-Claude Trichet floated the idea of devising 
a code of conduct for sovereign debt restructuring, to be embraced by the public as well as the 
private sector. See Raymond Ritter, Transnational Governance in Global Finance: Principles 
for Stable Capital Flows and Fair Debt Restructuring in Emerging Markets, 11 INT’L STUD. 
PERSP. 225 (2010). 
47 . LEX RIEFFEL, RESTRUCTURING SOVEREIGN DEBT: THE CASE FOR AD HOC 
MACHINERY 95 (2003). 
48. This author was a senior international economist for various Wall Street firms from 
1977 through early 2005 and was directly involved in several sovereign debt restructurings 
during his tenure. See Faculty Profile: Arturo Porzecanski, AM. UNIV. SCH. INT’L SERV., 
http://www.american.edu/sis/faculty/aporzeca.cfm (last visited Oct. 1, 2016). 
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Make a good-will, up-front cash payment—especially 
when circumstances permit 
Not practiced 
Aim for 100% creditor participation in order to 
minimize a holdout problem 
Not practiced 
 
Starting in 2001, as Argentine economic and financial problems 
worsened, communications with the country’s lenders and investors 
broke down just when they should have intensified. The International 
Monetary Fund (“IMF”) became Argentina’s single-largest creditor in 
2001, with net disbursements of nearly US$9 billion that year which 
brought the Fund’s exposure to a peak of US$14 billion. 49  The 
authorities took numerous economic measures in 2001 to kick-start 
the economy, eliminate the fiscal deficit, and restore investor 
confidence under extraordinary powers granted by the Argentine 
congress, but most of them were announced or adopted without prior 
consultation with the IMF—never mind with private creditors.50 The 
measures backfired, engendering capital flight, social protests, and 
political instability, which in turn provoked the resignation of 
President Fernando de la Rúa on December 20, 2001. 
There followed two chaotic weeks during which a default on the 
public-sector debt was announced by Acting President Adolfo 
Rodríguez Saá. The venue was his inaugural address to the legislature 
right after his swearing-in, and the justification provided for the 
moratorium was the need to redirect debt-service funds to an 
emergency jobs program and to increase social spending—a decision 
greeted by the assembled legislators with a standing ovation.51 The 
default was confirmed in early January 2002 by President Eduardo 
Duhalde, who had been elected by the Legislative Assembly to serve 
through 2003. Subsequently, a raft of additional economic measures 
was announced which likewise were undertaken without consulting 
the IMF, and which not only failed to stabilize the economic situation, 
																																																													
49. The IMF provided five successive financing arrangements to Argentina during 1991-
2001. From early 2000 onward, the IMF-supported programs attempted to address the 
country’s worsening recession and, increasingly, the government’s inability to access the 
international capital markets through the provision of substantial funds. See Evaluation 
Report: The IMF and Argentina, 1991-2001, INT’L MONETARY FUND 9 (2004). 
50. Id. at 46-47, 60-61. 
51. See Versión Taquigráfica, ASAMBLEA LEGISLATIVA DE LA REPÚBLICA ARGENTINA 
(Dec. 22, 2001), http://www1.hcdn.gov.ar/dependencias/dip/documentos/asuncion/22.12.01.  
RodriguezSaa.pdf. 
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but complicated the eventual resolution of the financial crisis.52 In 
sum, Argentina neither maintained a dialogue with its creditors about 
its key economic and financial policies, nor did it consult with them 
on how to forestall a default. 
In terms of engaging in timely, good faith negotiations with its 
creditors, there was none of that. In February 2002, the then-Economy 
Minister issued a first press release, explaining that the government 
was “devoting every effort to formulate and implement the various 
elements of its new economic program” and that it was preparing 
“plans for a proper basis for engaging in a fruitful dialogue with 
Argentina’s external creditors.”53 It was followed in April by a second 
communication stating that while Argentina was committed to a 
dialogue with its bondholders, the government had concluded “that it 
[is] preferable to initiate such a dialogue once greater certainty has 
been achieved.”54 Other such press releases followed, yet despite the 
formation of several bondholder groups ready to advise or negotiate, 
and the filing of the first lawsuits against Argentina,55 no dialogue 
was initiated in 2002 or 2003—never mind a negotiation. The 
following is how a recent IMF study summarized the post-default 
situation: 
[T]he authorities were expected to negotiate with creditor 
committees that were judged to be representative and formed in a 
timely manner. Although there were over thirty creditors’ 
committees, the Fund assessed that the Global Committee of 
Argentina Bondholders (GCAB) represented about one-half of 
Argentina’s external private debt, and was therefore 
representative for the purposes of [our] policy. In the end, 
however, no constructive dialogue was observed and the 
authorities presented a non-negotiated offer, which eventually led 
																																																													
52. See IMF, Lessons from the Crisis in Argentina, Occasional Paper No. 236 (2004).  
53. Press Release, Argentina Ministry of the Economy and Infrastructure (Feb. 8, 2002) 
(on file with author). 
54.  Letter from Argentina Secretary of Finance, to Bondholders (Apr. 10, 2002) (on file 
with author). 
55. For example, an attachment order was issued on July 19, 2002 by a court in Rome 
against the Republic of Argentina on behalf of a group of individual Italian bondholders. Press 
Release, Argentina Ministry of the Economy and Infrastructure (July 29, 2002) (on file with 
author). 
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to a restructuring of eligible debt and past-due interest of about 
two-fifths of total debt, more than three years after the default.56 
It is also good practice for sovereigns claiming to be over-indebted to 
stop accumulating new liabilities, but the authorities in Argentina did 
just the opposite. Especially damaging was the government’s 
announcement in February 2002 that banks’ assets and liabilities 
would be subject to an asymmetric conversion from US dollars into 
Argentine pesos. Their existing stock of dollar-denominated assets 
and liabilities would be forcibly converted at the pre-existing, one-to-
one exchange rate in the case of loans to the private sector but at a 
different, 1.4-to-one rate for loans to the government and for dollar 
deposits, which henceforth were also indexed to inflation. 57  The 
measure was intended to cushion from a devaluation firms and 
households with foreign-currency denominated debt to banks, by 
shifting the cost of the devaluation to the banking industry. However, 
since the banks could not possibly cope and most were rendered 
insolvent as a result, the burden was ultimately shifted to taxpayers 
and to the government’s creditors, because banks had to be 
reimbursed for their losses through “compensation bonds” issued by 
the government.58 Other policy decisions which added to the central 
government’s debt burden were the takeover of liabilities incurred by 
provincial governments in prior years and the issuance of still more 
bonds to settle previously contingent liabilities with pensioners, civil 
servants, victims of human rights abuses, and others.59 
Perhaps the one decision on Argentina’s part that grated on 
investors the most was the authorities’ demand for massive debt 
forgiveness despite the fact that, by the time a take-it-or-leave-it 
restructuring plan was put to them in early 2005, the economy had 
substantially recovered. 60  In general, governments seek debt relief 
																																																													
56. Yan Liu et al., Sovereign Debt Restructuring: Recent Developments and Implications 
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58. IMF, supra note 52, at 38. 
59. Arturo C. Porzecanski, From Rogue Creditors to Rogue Debtors: Implications of 
Argentina’s Default, 6 CHI. J. INT’L L. 315, 318 (2005). 
60. For example, according to a monthly index of seasonally adjusted economic activity, 
Argentina had returned to its pre-crisis high by March 2005. Ministerio de Economía y 
Finanzas Públicas, Dirección Nacional de Política Macroeconómica, Nivel de Actividad: 
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appropriate to the magnitude and nature of their liquidity or solvency 
problem, and their calculations are usually vetted by multilateral 
institutions like the IMF and the World Bank. That way, bondholders 
have some assurance that the losses (in market parlance, the 
“haircut”) they are asked to take are in accordance with the 
sovereign’s present and potential ability to pay. The irony is that if 
Argentina had sought major debt relief in 2002, soon after the default 
and when the economy was in a depression, it probably would have 
been received with greater sympathy. 
But by waiting for three excruciatingly long years to put a 
unilateral restructuring plan forward, giving time for an intervening 
commodity export boom to power a vigorous economic recovery 
which substantially replenished Argentina’s coffers, the authorities 
undermined their case. For example, the government’s tax revenues 
had already doubled between 2002 and 2004 measured in dollars, and 
the country’s official international reserves had recovered similarly, 
from under US$10 billion in early 2003 to over US$20 billion by 
early 2005.61  And yet, the forecasting model used by Argentina’s 
economic team to plead poverty to its creditors was never updated to 
reflect the strong economic rebound underway. It was also loaded 
with excessively pessimistic assumptions as to what the future would 
bring in terms of crucial variables such as exports and tax revenues. 
During 2006-2012, the economy ended up growing twice as fast as 
the government’s forecasts vintage late 2004, with actual export 
earnings and tax revenues outperforming the gloomy official 
assumptions by even greater multiples.62 Therefore, by early 2005, 
Argentina was positioned to justify only a modest amount of debt and 
debt-service relief from its creditors—and quite a few of them knew 
it. 63  The impression thus conveyed by the authorities was that 
																																																													
61. Arturo C. Porzecanski, Don’t Cry for Rogue Debtor Argentina, FIN. TIMES (June 12, 
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62. Id. 
63. See Grinding Them Down: Brutal Tactics May Pay Off – For Now, ECONOMIST (Jan. 
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Argentina was suffering from a case of unwillingness, more than 
inability, to pay. 
Argentina’s debt-restructuring proposal of early 2005 departed 
from best, or even usual, practice in several other ways. While other 
sovereigns in financial trouble, including Argentina itself in the past, 
had actively sought to avoid an event of default or had moved 
promptly to cure any default, in this case the government dragged its 
feet for more than three years and, adding insult to injury, largely 
refused to recognize the interest arrears that its own delay had 
generated.64 Contrary to other restructurings before, including those 
of Argentina previously, the 2005 plan was not accompanied by the 
usual reassuring endorsement—never mind backed with financial 
support—from the IMF, World Bank, or even a regional development 
agency like the Inter-American Development Bank.65 And in another 
break from tradition, Argentina’s 2005 restructuring failed to include 
an upfront payment to clear a portion of interest or principal arrears, a 
common “sweetener” to ensure success, which the country could 
afford.66 
IV. THE HOLDOUT PROBLEM 
With the benefit of hindsight, probably the most self-defeating 
departure from convention was Argentina’s decision not to aim for 
100 percent participation of its bondholders in the debt restructuring, 
or even to set a high bar (e.g., eighty-five or ninety percent approval) 
for the transaction to go forth, in order to prevent a holdout problem. 
In fact, when launching the debt-restructuring proposal, Economy 
Minister Roberto Lavagna went so far as to state that the government 
would regard any participation rate above fifty percent as having 
effectively cured the country’s default.67 
																																																													
64. Argentina refused to pay the interest arrears accumulated in 2002 and 2003, whether 
calculated at contractual or lower interest rates—until that time, the only government to have 
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The clear implication was that even if nearly half of all 
bondholders failed to accept the terms of the punishing debt 
restructuring, they would and could be ignored. To ensure the 
message was heard loud and clear, three weeks into the transaction, 
the government sent a draft law to the legislature forbidding the 
Executive from reopening the transaction in the future, and engaging 
in any dealings with bondholders arising from any court order or 
otherwise, without prior approval by the legislature.68 This infamous 
“Lock Law” (or “Cram-Down Law”) was passed within one week. 
The law thus complemented Argentina’s warnings in the deal’s 
prospectus, and in all presentations in the major capitals, that any 
existing defaulted bonds that were eligible to be restructured but were 
not tendered would remain in default indefinitely—because the 
government had no intention of ever resuming payments on those 
bonds.69 
A recent scholarly study of sovereign defaults, which provides 
the first comprehensive and systematic assessment of debtor-
government behavior during financial crises, puts the above 
observations into comparative context.70 The authors developed an 
objective index of government coerciveness, capturing 
confrontational debtor policies vis-à-vis private external creditors in 
times of debt distress, drawing on criteria suggested by the IMF and 
the Institute of International Finance, one of the main contributors to 
the aforementioned Principles.71 Their sample includes just over 100 
restructurings involving commercial banks and bondholders, whether 
domestic or foreign, during the 1980-2007 period—the universe of 
sovereign default and restructuring relevant to private-sector lenders 
and investors. The following is the study’s most pertinent result: 
																																																													
68 . The law (Law No. 26.017, adopted on February 9, 2005) also mandated the 
government to do everything in its power to delist all bonds not tendered into the exchange and 
to unilaterally exchange all bonds tied up in litigation against Argentina into new Par bonds 
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2005, REPUBLIC OF ARGENTINA (Feb. 4, 2005), http://www.mecon.gov.ar/finanzas/sfinan/
english/download/addendum_feb_4.pdf.  
69.  Prospectus Supplement (to Prospectus Dated Dec. 27, 2004), S-29, REPUBLIC OF 
ARGENTINA (Jan. 10, 2005), http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/914021/0000950123  
05000302/y04567e424b5.htm [hereinafter Prospectus Supplement]. 
70 . Henrik Enderlein, Christoph Trebesch, & Laura von Daniels, Sovereign Debt 
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71.  Id. at 251. 
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The well-known case of Argentina from 2001 to 2005 displays an 
exceptional degree of coerciveness, as the government officially 
declares a default, sticks to the proclaimed moratorium by 
stopping all payments to its bondholders for four years, freezes 
foreign assets, and rejects any meaningful negotiations.72 
Argentina’s choice to defy convention and rely heavily on a “stick” 
rather than “carrot” approach to creditor participation in its debt 
restructuring was a risky strategy. The 2005 restructuring was 
accepted by a mere seventy-six percent of total bondholders (namely, 
the owners of US$62.3 billion of defaulted bonds out of a target 
universe of US$81.8 billion), far below the ninety-five percent 
average degree of creditor participation registered in thirty-four 
sovereign bond restructurings from 1997 through early 2013.73 On the 
one hand, the transaction succeeded in erasing US$27 billion of 
principal owed and in achieving also significant concessions in terms 
of greatly extended maturities, drastically lower coupons, and 
forgiveness of 2002-03 past-due interest payments incorporated into 
the US$35.3 billion of new bonds issued: all in all, a “haircut” to 
participating bondholders of at least seventy percent. On the other 
hand, Argentina created for itself a holdout constituency without 
precedent: the owners of nearly US$20 billion in defaulted bonds 
accruing contractual interest from December 2001 at high coupons 
and high penalty rates on any arrears. The holdouts featured mostly 
foreign investors whose participation rate in the restructuring was 
much lower (an estimated sixty-three percent) than Argentine 
investors (around ninety-five percent). 74  These holdouts included 
institutional and retail investors from all around the world. 
Evidently, while the threat of indefinite non-payment for 
holdouts helped to persuade most bondholders to capitulate and 
accept the harsh terms on offer, it also motivated many to spurn the 
deal and either file suit or else await better treatment on the part of 
some future government. And investors who had purchased any of the 
numerous bonds that Argentina had issued under New York State law 
according to a Fiscal Agency Agreement (“FAA”) structure certainly 
had strong legal rights: as was typical of indentures up until the early 
																																																													
72. Id. at 261. 
73 . The Role of Holdout Creditors and CACs in Sovereign Debt Restructurings, 
MOODY’S INV. SERV. 32-33 (2013), https://www.moodys.com/researchdocumentcontentpage.  
aspx?docid=PBC_150162. 
74. STURZENEGGER & ZETTELMEYER, supra note 36, at 192-93. 
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2000s, the 1994 FAA contained provisions to protect purchasers of its 
bonds from subordination, and provided that a holder’s right to 
receive payment of principal and interest on their respective due dates 
could not be impaired without their consent.75 In the past decade, in 
contrast, the typical bond indentures used by sovereign borrowers, 
whether in New York or in Europe, have come to include collective-
action clauses enabling a qualified majority of bondholders (typically 
seventy-five percent) to approve payment and other modifications in a 
vote that binds the minority of dissenting bondholders. 
Given that by the time the debt restructuring deal was being 
formulated the authorities in Argentina knew that a number of 
investors had already taken the path of litigation, it is surprising that 
they nevertheless decided to persevere with such a confrontational 
approach. In the prospectus presenting the debt-restructuring offer 
filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) in 
January 2005, it was disclosed as follows: 
Bondholders have initiated numerous lawsuits against Argentina 
in the United States, Italy and Germany based on the 
Government’s default on its public debt obligations. In the 
United States, approximately 39 suits, including one suit certified 
as a class action and 14 suits purporting to be class actions, have 
been filed since March 2002, and judgment has been entered 
against the Government in seven cases in a total amount of 
approximately $740 million. In Italy the total amount claimed in 
bondholder proceedings against the government is €64 million 
plus interest, while in Germany the total amount claimed is €58 
million plus interest. We can give no assurance that further 
litigation will not result in even more substantial judgments 
granted against the Government. Present or future litigation could 
result in the attachment or injunction of assets of Argentina that 
the Government intends for other uses, and could have a material 
adverse effect on public finances and on the market price of new 
securities we issue in an exchange offer.76 
In a lengthy insider’s account of the transaction by one of its leading 
architects published in March 2006, a year after the transaction 
closed, then Finance Secretary of Argentina Guillermo Nielsen spent 
																																																													
75 . David J. Johnson Jr., Some Lessons for Distressed Debt Participants from the 
Argentina-NML Dispute, O’MELVENY & MYERS (July 3, 2014), https://www.omm.com/  
resources/alerts-and-publications/publications/some-lessons-for-distressed-debt-participants-
from-the-argentina-nml-dispute/. 
76. Prospectus Supplement, supra note 69, at 27. 
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more than 5,000 words describing everything that transpired behind 
closed doors in the run-up to the landmark debt restructuring. 77 
Surprisingly, the words “holdout” or “litigation” never even came up 
in his narrative. Apparently, the Argentine authorities and their 
financial and legal advisors—mainly Barclays Capital and Cleary, 
Gottlieb, respectively—must have been persuaded that achieving 
large-scale debt relief, even if by confrontational means, was a goal 
worthy of the risk of generating a major holdout problem. This was 
possibly because, as of that date, investor litigation had not yet caused 
major headaches for Argentina.78 Private creditors, after all, had faced 
daunting challenges in executing judgments and collecting assets 
from Argentina. 
In the years following the 2005 debt restructuring, Argentina’s 
economy, tax revenues and export earnings continued to outperform 
all expectations (except during the global financial crisis, from mid-
2008 through mid-2009), greatly enhancing the country’s ability to 
service its debts, including its remaining defaulted obligations. 
However, despite this improvement in creditworthiness and some 
intervening changes in political leadership (mainly from President 
Néstor Kirchner to his wife Cristina), the government maintained an 
unyielding attitude toward investor holdouts. 
As time passed and it became evident that, whether they litigated 
or not, holdout investors would neither collect nor get better terms 
from an intransigent Argentina, most of them gradually came to 
accept the idea that recovering something was better than nothing. 
Therefore, upon advice from its leading banks (mainly Barclays 
Capital, again), in late 2009 the government requested the Argentine 
congress to temporarily suspend the “Lock Law,” so that the debt-
restructuring window could be opened anew to bondholders who had 
rejected the 2005 transaction. 79  Tenders of defaulted bonds were 
																																																													
77. Inside Argentina’s Financial Crisis, 37 EUROMONEY 64 (2006). 
78 . The government at the time and its successors through 2015 did not return to 
international capital markets, such that lack of access evidently was not viewed as a problem 
worth solving by settling with holdout creditors. 
79. Later that year, Argentina started informal conversations with member countries of 
the so-called Paris Club, a gathering of representatives from official trade-finance and foreign-
aid agencies, because its obligations to them had remained in default since the end of 2001. 
However, it was not until May 2014 that Argentina finally agreed to pay one hundred percent 
of the principal and interest payments it owed its official bilateral creditors, albeit on a five-
year installment plan, and the government made its first payment on July 30, 2014, as 
scheduled. See Press Release, The Paris Club and the Argentine Republic Agree to a 
Resumption of Payments and to Clearance of All Arrears (May 29, 2014), 
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accepted during May-September and again in December of 2010 on 
slightly worse exchange terms than those applied in 2005.80 The result 
was that approximately two-thirds of the holdouts accepted the 
conditions, such that about US$12.4 billion of defaulted principal was 
tendered in exchange for new bonds. Consequently, the bondholder 
participation rate in Argentina’s restructuring increased from the 
initial seventy-six percent to over ninety-two percent of the universe 
of defaulted bonds, thus greatly reducing the holdout universe from 
twenty-four percent to just over seven percent of the original bonds— 
an estimated US$6 billion plus accrued interest and penalty interest.81 
The dramatic reduction in the universe of holdouts had mixed 
consequences. On the one hand, fewer holdouts meant that in 2010 
Argentina came closer to achieving its original restructuring 
objectives—over ninety-two percent of its 2001 bonded debt in 
default had been put through the wringer and was now performing— 
and to normalizing its relations with the international investor 
community.82 On the other hand, after spurning two opportunities to 
take their losses and conform, the remaining holdouts now constituted 
a committed, hard core of disgruntled investors who were seemingly 
determined to litigate against Argentina until the bitter end. An 
illustration of the latter aspect is that in Argentina’s Form 18-K 
Annual Report filed with the SEC in 2011, the authorities had to 
devote about 4,400 words to describe the litigation challenges they 
faced in the United States, Europe, and Japan, versus fewer than 200 
words devoted to the subject in the aforementioned filing in 2005. 
In particular, the 2011 filing detailed litigation in the United 
States involving over 150 individual lawsuits, on which judgments 
																																																																																																																																								
http://www.clubdeparis.org/sections/communication/communiques/argentine/switchLanguage/
en.  
80. In the 2005 debt exchange, past-due interest for 2004 was paid in cash; in the 2010 
reopening, past-due interest since 2003 was paid with bonds. 
81 . Argentine State Public Debt, NAT’L BUREAU PUB. CREDIT (Sept. 30, 2010), 
http://www.mecon.gob.ar/finanzas/sfinan/english/download/informe_deuda_publica_30-09-
10_english.pdf; Argentine State Public Debt, NAT’L BUREAU PUB. CREDIT (Dec. 31, 2011), 
http://www.mecon.gob.ar/finanzas/sfinan/english/download/informe_deuda_publica_31-12-
10_ingles.pdf. 
82. A reflection of this progress is that in the wake of the successful 2010 reopening, 
Fitch Ratings upgraded Argentina’s long-term foreign currency rating to ‘B’ from ‘RD’ 
(Restricted Default). See Fitch Lifts Argentina out of Default to ‘B’; Outlook Stable (July 12, 
2010), https://www.fitchratings.com/creditdesk/press_releases/detail.cfm?pr_id=599659. 
Standard & Poor’s followed with an upgrade of its long-term foreign and local currency credit 
ratings on Argentina to ‘B’ from ‘B-.” See Standard & Poor’s, Ratings on Republic of 
Argentina Raised to ‘B’ (Sept. 10, 2010) (on file with author). 
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had been entered in almost 110 cases for nearly US$5.9 billion of 
past-due principal and interest; eighteen class-action suits 
representing groups of retail investors, of which thirteen had been 
certified; and multiple attempts to attach Argentine commercial and 
other property in the United States. In Germany, nearly 650 legal 
proceedings had been initiated against Argentina by bondholders, and 
more than 460 judgments had been rendered against it, for some 
EUR€240 million in principal plus interest. The government also had 
to contend with ongoing litigation in Belgium, France, Italy, Japan 
and Switzerland.83 
It is some of this litigation that would come to haunt Argentina 
in later years, as explained at the outset of this article. 
V. ORIGINS OF INVESTOR ARBITRATION 
During the 1990s, government policies established a very 
business-friendly investment climate in Argentina by means of an 
ambitious campaign of economic liberalization, deregulation, and 
privatization, combined with a drastic anti-inflation program and 
various other structural reforms. 
The government also broke with nationalistic traditions and 
sought out foreign investment by partnering up with foreign countries 
interested in signing bilateral investment-protection agreements, to 
the point where Argentina concluded and ratified more BITs than any 
other nation in Latin America. Between 1990 and 2001, Argentina 
signed fifty-eight different BITs, of which fifty-five were ratified and 
entered into force by 2001 or shortly thereafter. In contrast, even 
fifteen years later, in mid-2016, Chile had ratified fewer than forty 
BITs; Mexico, Peru and Venezuela, thirty or fewer; Colombia, six; 
and Brazil, none—just to mention the larger countries in the region.84 
Furthermore, Argentina firmly accepted recourse to international 
arbitration, a major about-face because prior to the 1990s the country 
always had been opposed to signing any agreements containing 
international arbitration clauses out of its adherence to the Calvo 
Doctrine and its commitment to insert “Calvo Clauses” in investment 
contracts. Named after a nineteenth century Argentine diplomat and 
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jurist, Carlos Calvo, the Doctrine stated that legal disputes regarding 
foreign (private) investors should be adjudicated and resolved by the 
local courts of the host country, rather than by international legal 
remedies entailing an unacceptable surrender of national 
sovereignty.85 
This new attitude and business climate enticed many 
multinational corporations to set up affiliates or purchase existing 
concerns in the country, and it also persuaded foreign portfolio 
investors to buy stocks issued by local companies, as well as bonds 
floated by private and government issuers. During the period 1992-
2000, a cumulative US$74 billion of foreign direct investment came 
into Argentina, 86  as did an additional US$85 billion of foreign 
portfolio investment87—by far the largest amounts of such capital 
inflows in so short a period in the country’s history. 
Early on, the authorities engaged in a remarkable privatization 
program: within a few years mainly in the early 1990s, the 
government sold off virtually all of its state-owned enterprises (e.g., 
the leading oil company plus electricity generation and gas 
distribution firms, as well as its telephone company once split into 
two entities), or else invited private investors to bid for the right to 
operate them (e.g., railways, airports, and water and sewage services) 
under long-term concession agreements. Proceeds from privatizations 
during 1990-1999 totaled almost US$24 billion, and the majority of 
the funds for investment in previously state-owned entities were 
provided by foreign lenders and investors.88 
In the wake of the privatizations and concessions, new 
regulatory structures were created with a mandate to set utility rates 
and other prices at levels that were “fair and reasonable” and allowed 
for a “reasonable rate of return.”89 Investors, most of them foreign, 
came to benefit from a number of guarantees, measures, or 
mechanisms; for example, public-utility rates were to be set for five-
year periods, at the end of which they would be reviewed and 
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adjusted according to the aforementioned criteria. Investors subject to 
the regulatory process had a right to calculate prices in US dollars and 
then convert them to Argentine pesos at the time of billing. They also 
had a right to a semi-annual rate review based on inflation in the 
United States. The government could not rescind or modify licenses 
granted without the consent of the licensees. Utility rates and prices 
were not to be subject to any other controls, and in the event that any 
such controls were imposed, the government was to compensate the 
licensees fully for any resulting losses. Other relevant reforms 
included passage of the 1991 Convertibility Law, which provided for 
the free exchange of the Argentine currency pegged to the US dollar 
on a one-to-one basis, an arrangement which foreign investors found 
particularly convenient—at least during the decade while it lasted—
because it was perceived to minimize exchange-rate risks.90 
However, the investment climate changed abruptly in early 
2002, when the Duhalde Administration confirmed the debt default 
and passed the Public Emergency and Exchange Rate Reform Law 
#25.561 (the “Public Emergency Law”) in an attempt to end an 
economic recession and defuse social tensions by making major 
adjustments to economic policies.91 This law abolished the peg of the 
Argentine peso to the dollar, opening the way for a severe devaluation 
of the peso.92 It also decreed the compulsory switch from dollars into 
pesos, at the old exchange rate of one-to-one, in the denomination of 
all existing loan contracts of up to US$100,000 with financial 
intermediaries—effectively, most such dollar contracts outstanding, 
including credit card debt and mortgages, all contracts entered into by 
the public sector in connection with the delivery of public services, 
and also all contracts entered into in Argentina among private parties. 
Moreover, the law terminated the right of privatized public 
utilities to rates calculated in dollars and adjusted according to US 
inflation, and required the renegotiation of agreements to adapt them 
to the new exchange-rate system. In the weeks that followed, many 
other arbitrary economic measures were adopted. Dollar-denominated 
deposits, which represented three-quarters of total deposits as of end-
2001, were ordered frozen until at least 2003. To dampen inflationary 
pressures, rates charged by public (but privately owned) utilities (e.g., 
gas, electricity, telephones and water) were frozen indefinitely at their 
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new peso equivalents. Companies were also affected by restrictions 
on foreign-exchange transactions that prevented them from making 
dividend and capital-repatriation transfers abroad. Moreover, the 
government rescinded certain contracts (e.g., postal and railway 
concessions were revoked) and the legislature approved an emergency 
law that severely curtailed creditor rights, in order to forestall a 
potential wave of liquidations.93 
VI. DEPARTURES FROM BEST PRACTICE 
Argentina’s radical and unilateral changes in the “rules of the 
game” affecting foreign strategic investors broke with good practice 
as settled already in the early 2000s, by which time ample experience 
had taught how to foster a good business climate in order to promote 
private-sector investment, job creation, and economic growth. 
While the authorities claimed throughout the 2002-2015 period 
that the many measures taken were absolutely necessary to resolve 
their economic emergency, the policy mix as a whole was 
understandably regarded by most foreign investors as akin to an 
expropriation without adequate compensation. And indeed, a 
comparison of how Argentina behaved in the face of its economic and 
financial woes versus how other countries did so during the 1980s and 
1990 is instructive, as it reveals the extent to which the authorities in 
Buenos Aires departed from best practices in investment-climate 
promotion.94 
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TABLE 2: ARGENTINA’S BEHAVIOR RELATIVE TO BEST 
PRACTICE IN INVESTMENT CLIMATE PROMOTION 
 
Best Practice Argentina 
Respect contracts allowing for price increases in 
line with currency depreciation 
Not practiced 
Refrain from applying selective price controls Not practiced 
Respect the currency denomination of financial 
assets and liabilities 
Not practiced 
Establish a contract renegotiation process open to 
firms in litigation or arbitration 
Not practiced 
Refrain from applying controls on capital inflows 
and/or outflows, disrupting cross-border flows 
Not practiced 
Refrain from imposing a freeze on bank deposits Not practiced 
Refrain from suspending the application of 
bankruptcy and/or foreclosure laws 
Not practiced 
Refrain from claiming that the state of public 
emergency continues despite the passage of time 
Not practiced 
Seek debt relief justified by the nature of the 
liquidity or solvency problem 
Not practiced 
Honor court judgments and arbitral awards Not practiced 
 
The measures adopted under Argentina’s Public Emergency Law 
invalidated contracts and gravely affected the financial well-being 
especially of foreign investors. The measures amounted to a complete 
dismantling of the legal, economic, and financial frameworks put in 
place in Argentina during the 1990s to attract precisely those 
investors.95  While a state of economic emergency (“necessity”) may 
justify the temporary suspension of investor-friendly policies and the 
adoption of discriminatory and arbitrary measures, what unfolded in 
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Argentina starting in 2002 was the de facto permanent abrogation of 
rights previously granted to investors.96 
The Public Emergency Law as passed was scheduled to sunset at 
the end of 2003, but successive administrations in Argentina went on 
to request time and again that the legislature approve replacement 
laws extending the deadline for the expiration of their emergency 
powers.  In the event, ten different laws were passed prolonging the 
state of public emergency and the powers conferred on the Executive,   
with the latest version (Law #27.200) enacted in November 2015 
keeping the status quo through the end of 2017.97  Therefore, by early 
2016, Argentina had spent fourteen years in an uninterrupted 
“emergency,” despite “the principle expressly stated in Argentina’s 
Constitution and in precedents from [its] Federal Supreme Court, 
according to which such emergency powers must only be of a 
transitory, non-permanent character.”98 
Argentina’s claim that a state of economic emergency justified 
the ripping up of contracts was made again and again for over a dozen 
years, and it quickly rung hollow on objective economic grounds.  
After nose-diving in the first half of 2002, the Argentine economy hit 
a bottom later that year, and the exchange rate and other financial 
variables began to stabilize, albeit at very depressed levels. As 
discussed previously, the Argentine economy began to rebound in 
2003 and continued to grow in 2004 and subsequent years.99  For 
example, in 2000 GDP per capita exceeded US$9,000 but fell to 
US$3,200 in 2002, only to skyrocket to more than US$14,500 in 2012 
and 2013.100 Since there were no natural disasters or economic crises 
in Argentina warranting an emergency designation after 2002, the 
state of public emergency and the extraordinary powers conferred on 
the Executive served as an excuse for Argentina to delay indefinitely 
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the restoration of investor rights, repair of broken contracts, and 
payment of compensation for the grievous losses incurred by 
investors. 
Indeed, the state of economic emergency and its continuous 
renewal discouraged new strategic investors and curtailed pre-existing 
investors’ rights in various ways.  In this connection, the 
aforementioned case involving the BG Group is illustrative.101  In the 
early 1990s, the BG Group had participated in a consortium that 
purchased a majority interest in MetroGAS, a privatized Argentine 
gas distributor. 102   The company was awarded a thirty-five year 
exclusive license to distribute natural gas in Buenos Aires, and the 
government at the time passed legislation that calculated gas tariffs in 
US dollars and set these tariffs at a sufficient level to assure 
reasonable returns to gas distributors such as MetroGAS. 
However, in early 2002, at the start of the state of economic 
emergency, the government decreed that gas prices would henceforth 
be set in Argentine pesos, which would soon be worth a fraction of 
their former exchange value.  This change caused MetroGAS’s input 
prices to triple (in reflection of the currency’s initial devaluation) 
while its output prices remained stagnant and in pesos. 103  This 
measure turned MetroGAS from a modestly profitable company into 
a money-losing operation—potentially, permanently so. 
Argentina subsequently established by statute a renegotiation 
process for contracts like the one with MetroGAS, but simultaneously 
barred any firm from participating in that process if the firm was 
litigating against Argentina in court or in arbitration.104  This caught 
the BG Group and many other investors between the proverbial “rock 
and a hard place.” Under the Argentina-UK BIT, parties could not 
submit their claims directly to arbitration absent an agreement to do 
so.105  Without an arbitration agreement, the parties could not proceed 
to arbitration without first failing to receive a final decision from a 
local Argentine court within eighteen months of filing the claim or 
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failing to resolve the dispute despite the local court’s final decision.106  
As was eventually established by the BG Group without contest, the 
impact of the government’s decree nullified the ability of a local 
Argentine court to conduct the process envisioned by the BIT within 
the specified timetable, and instead created what was characterized as 
an “absurd and unreasonable” process whereby the BG Group would 
never be able to complete the eighteen-month process required to 
proceed to arbitration.107 
When the BG Group company nevertheless initiated the 
arbitration claim, Argentina contended that the tribunal lacked 
jurisdiction to hear the dispute, because the BG Group had failed to 
comply with the first step in the process, namely, litigating the dispute 
initially in Argentina’s courts. The arbitration panel was sympathetic 
to the BG Group’s dilemma and so years later was the US Supreme 
Court. The latter reversed the US Court of Appeals for the District of 
Columbia Circuit by ruling arbitrators had authority to determine 
whether the matter was properly submitted to arbitration.108 
VII. THE ARBITRATION OPTION 
Many multinational companies came to Argentina during the 
1990s under the umbrella of dozens of bilateral investment treaties 
that were signed and ratified by Argentina and their own 
governments.  Foreign portfolio investors, particularly retail and 
institutional bondholders, were likewise reassured by the existence of 
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these agreements. Consequently, after the adverse economic events in 
2001 and 2002, foreign investors could do more than merely lick their 
financial wounds and lobby for compensation: they could file requests 
for international arbitration, alleging breach of contract under their 
respective country’s bilateral investment treaty. 
As time passed and it became clear that the Argentine authorities 
would neither restore the investment climate nor compensate for 
damages caused, a growing number of arbitrations were indeed 
sought primarily through ICSID. By the middle of 2002, Argentina 
was the target of four new arbitrations at ICSID,109 up from just one 
filed by mid-2001.110 A year later, namely by mid-2003, the number 
of new ICSID arbitrations requested against Argentina had soared to 
eleven. 111  In total through mid-2016, fifty-three arbitrations 
proceedings were filed with this venue112—the most ever to date 
against a single party to the ICSID Convention, which has been 
ratified by 153 countries.113 
Most claimants would allege that the emergency measures taken 
in 2001 and 2002 were inconsistent with the fair and equitable 
treatment standards set forth in various bilateral investment treaties to 
which Argentina was a party.  Frequently challenged measures 
included the suspension and eventual elimination of various rate-
indexing mechanisms provided for in the contracts for public utilities 
and the forcible conversion from US dollars into Argentine pesos of 
certain contracts and rates charged by public utilities.114 Claimants 
often also highlighted the restrictions on foreign exchange 
transactions that prevented companies from sending dividend and 
other transfer payments abroad, and of course where applicable, the 
unilateral termination of contracts to operate in Argentina. 
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Argentina’s prospectus presenting its debt-restructuring plan to 
the Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) in January 2005 
greatly understated Argentina’s involvement in arbitrations: 
Several arbitration proceedings have been brought against 
Argentina before the International Centre for the Settlement of 
Investment Disputes (ICSID) challenging some of the emergency 
measures adopted by the Government in 2001 and 2002 and 
seeking compensation for damages.  These proceedings have 
been brought primarily by foreign investors in a number of 
privatized entities under various bilateral investment treaties.  We 
can offer no assurance that the Government will prevail in these 
claims.  Rulings against the Government in these proceedings 
could have a material adverse effect on our finances and our 
ability to service our public debt, including any new securities we 
issue in an exchange offer.115 
This understatement was likely related to Argentina’s decision to 
dispute every claim vigorously. For example, the State frequently 
questioned the scope of the jurisdictional phase and the admissibility 
of the claim, the arbitrators’ qualifications, the admissibility of 
documents for witness and expert examination, the conduct and 
language of the proceedings, and all other aspects of the arbitration 
including the post-award annulment proceedings. 
The understatement presented to the SEC was likely also 
illustrative of Argentina’s reluctance to pay the awards rendered 
against it.  Early on, Argentina took the position that, under Articles 
53 and 54 of the ICSID Convention, all award holders must submit to 
the authority of a national (Argentine) court and follow the formalities 
applicable for collecting on a judgment against Argentina in 
Argentina, which is basically a return to the aforementioned Calvo 
Doctrine.116 Such an interpretation of the enforceability of arbitral 
awards is unique and likely unpopular among most ICSID members, 
because if local review of “final” awards were to become the norm, 
then the ICSID arbitral process would become toothless.117And of 
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course, Argentina’s rogue behavior with regard to its non-payment of 
arbitral awards ran parallel to its dogged refusal to pay foreign court 
judgments—despite surrendering its immunity and committing itself 
to be bound by foreign judicial and arbitral rulings.  
Six years later in 2011, the description of the nation’s arbitration 
challenges included in Argentina’s Form 18-K Annual Report filed 
with the SEC totaled nearly 1,350 words.  This was a drastic increase 
from the 105-word description included in the 2005 Prospectus.118  
The Form 18-K Annual Report included forty-five claims filed before 
ICSID against Argentina, of which eleven proceedings had been 
discontinued or had the claims withdrawn.119  That brought the total 
number of ICSID claims against Argentina to thirty-four, with their 
total damages totaling approximately US$13.6 billion.120   Nine of 
these thirty-four claims had been suspended by the time Form 18-K 
Annual Report was filed to allow for settlement negotiations with the 
government and eight more had already been decided against 
Argentina, totaling in aggregate an award of slightly more than 
US$900 million.121 Argentina consistently applied for annulments of 
unfavorable awards pursuant to Chapter VII of the ICSID Arbitration 
Rules, and by 2011 two awards against Argentina had been 
successfully annulled and one more had been renounced by the 
victorious claimant, saving the State in total US$452 million.122 
As of early 2016, various international arbitration tribunals had 
issued twelve final awards against Argentina, totaling US$1.6 billion. 
The country was also involved in an additional eighteen ongoing 
arbitrations at that time with claims totaling US$7.1 billion.123 This 
excluded five arbitrations, which had been settled in 2013 for an 
aggregate total of US$510 million against Argentina. 124  Of these 
ongoing ICSID arbitrations, the most monetarily significant was the 
previously discussed case (Abaclat & Others v. The Argentine 
Republic) involving more than 190,000 of an estimated 600,000 
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intervention by a judicial authority in the host State would render the awards simply a piece of 
paper deprived from any legal value and dependent on the will of state organs.”). 
118. See Republic of Argentina, Annual Report (Form 18-K), supra note 83, at 190-92. 
119. Id. at 190. 
120. Id. 
121. See id. at 190-91 (providing all available arbitral awards rendered against Argentina 
from 2005 to 2008).  
122. See id. at 191.  
123. See Offering Memorandum, REPUBLIC OF ARG. 29 (Apr. 19, 2016). 
124. See id. at 29-30. 
76 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 40:1 
Italian retail bondholders whose claims totaled US$4.4 billion, but 
was later reduced to some 60,000 investors with an estimated claim of 
US$2.5 billion. 125  In April 2015, US$405 million was reportedly 
awarded to claimants Suez of France and Sociedad General de Aguas 
de Barcelona of Spain, two water companies party to the arbitration 
Suez, Sociedad General de Aguas de Barcelona S.A. and Interagua 
Servicios Integrales de Agua S.A. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case 
No. ARB/03/17. 126  The authorities in Argentina immediately 
announced that, as usual, they would be filing for an annulment 
proceeding.127 In addition to the ICSID arbitrations, Argentina faced 
investment disputes in UNCITRAL arbitrations as well, two of 
which—including BG Group v. Republic of Argentina discussed 
supra—had rendered awards against Argentina totaling US$238 
million.128 
CONCLUSION 
In sum, the origins of Argentina’s litigation and arbitration saga 
are to be found in the country’s rogue behavior both at home and 
abroad, especially in the early years from 2002 to 2005. For 
ideological reasons, successive Argentine governments refused to 
follow the well-worn playbook of how economic policy adjustments 
are to be made in order to minimize damage to the investment 
climate, preserve access to the international capital markets, and 
promote rapid and sustainable economic growth. The Argentine 
government quite deliberately chose to sacrifice the strategic, 
portfolio, and other investors who had entered into Argentina during 
the 1990s and helped to catapult the country into the modern era. It 
did so pursuant to a nationalist and populist ideology that taxed or 
expropriated the income and wealth of international investors in order 
to redistribute it mainly to domestic urban consumers, especially 
through subsidized energy and artificially low prices for public 
utilities. 
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The benefits of the voluminous and protracted Argentina-related 
litigation and arbitration that transpired include the assertion and 
expansion of creditor rights against sovereigns, as well as the 
establishment of several major judicial and arbitral precedents. The 
costs of the Argentina saga, on the other hand, were the enormous 
legal expenses all around; the frustration of judicial and arbitral 
vehicles for the resolution of conflicts; reputational losses and 
financial isolation for the government of Argentina and its private 
sector; and the accumulation of a mountain of unpaid and contingent 
claims.  It is good that in late 2015 the Argentine people elected a 
reformist government with an explicit mandate to finally settle all of 
the judgments and awards that were pending against it, and to change 
the direction of economic and foreign policy in a constructive manner 
—which is in fact what has transpired during the course of 2016. 
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